
Chapter 6 Voters And Voter Behavior Outline

Getting the books Chapter 6 Voters And Voter Behavior Outline now is not type of challenging means. You could not solitary going next books accrual or library or borrowing from your connections to admission them. This is an completely simple means to specifically get lead by on-line. This online notice Chapter 6 Voters And Voter Behavior Outline can be one of the options to accompany you later than having supplementary time.

It will not waste your time. give a positive response me, the e-book will unquestionably express you further concern to read. Just invest tiny times to gate this on-line revelation Chapter 6 Voters And Voter Behavior Outline as capably as review them wherever you are now.



Algorithmic Aspects of Manipulation and

Anonymization in Social Choice and Social

Networks Basic Books

This thesis presents a study of several combinatorial problems related to social choice and social networks. The main concern is their computational

complexity, with an emphasis on their parameterized complexity. The goal is to devise efficient algorithms for each of the problems studied here, or to prove that, under widely-accepted assumptions, such algorithms cannot exist. The problems discussed in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4 are about manipulating a given election, where some relationships between the entities of the election are assumed. This can be seen as if the election occurs on top of an underlying social network, connecting the voters participating in the election or the candidates which the voters vote on. The problem discussed in Chapter 3, Combinatorial Candidate Control, is

about manipulating an election by changing the set of candidates which the voters vote on. That is, there is an external agent who can add new candidates or delete existing candidates. A combinatorial structure over the candidates is assumed, such that whenever the external agent adds or removes a candidate, a predefined set of candidates (related to the chosen candidate) are added or removed from the election. The problem discussed in Chapter 4, Combinatorial Shift Bribery, is also about manipulating an election. Here, however, the external agent can change the way some voters vote. Specifically, a combinatorial structure over the voters is assumed,

such that the external network (modeled as a graph) is to become publicly available. The task is to anonymize the graph; that is, to transform the graph such that, for every vertex, there will be at least $k - 1$ other vertices with the same degree. By doing so, even an adversary which knows the degrees of some vertices cannot identify individual vertices. In the problem discussed in Chapter 6, Degree Anonymization by Vertex Addition, the way to achieve anonymity is by introducing new vertices. In the problem discussed in Chapter 7, Degree Anonymization By Graph Contractions, the way to achieve anonymity is by contracting as few edges as possible. The main aim of this

thesis, considering the tractable with respect to some parameters, problems mentioned above, is to explore or, even better, to show that the problems some boundaries between tractability and intractability. are NP-hard even when some parameters are Specifically, as most assumed to be of these problems are constant. Diese computationally intractable (that is, Dissertation stellt NP-hard or even hard to approximate), some eine Untersuchung von restricted cases and kombinatorischen parameterizations for Problemen im Umfeld these problems are von Wahlen und considered. The goal sozialen Netzwerken is to devise efficient dar. Das Hauptziel ist algorithms for them, die Analyse der running in polynomial- Berechnungskomplexität time when some mit dem Schwerpunkt parameters are assumed auf der to be constant, or, parametrisierten even better, to show Komplexität. Dabei that the problems are werden für jedes der fixed-parameter untersuchten Probleme tractable for the effiziente Algorithmen parameters considered. entworfen oder aber If such algorithms gezeigt, dass unter cannot be devised, weit akzeptierten Annahmen solche then the goal is to Algorithmen nicht prove that these existieren können. Die problems are indeed Probleme, welche im not fixed-parameter Kapitel 3 und im

Kapitel 4 diskutiert werden, modellieren das Manipulieren einer gegebenen Wahl, bei welcher gewisse Beziehungen zwischen den Beteiligten angenommen werden. Dies kann so interpretiert werden, dass die Wahl innerhalb eines Sozialen Netzwerks stattfindet, in dem die Wähler oder die Kandidaten miteinander in Verbindung stehen. Das Problem Combinatorial Candidate Control ONTROL, welches in Kapitel 3 untersucht wird, handelt von der Manipulation einer Wahl durch die Änderung der Kandidatenmenge über welche die Wähler abstimmen. Genauer gesagt, gibt es einen externen Agenten, welcher neue Kandidaten hinzufügen

oder existierende Kandidaten entfernen kann. Es wird eine kombinatorische Struktur über der Kandidatenmenge angenommen, so dass immer wenn der externe Agent einen Kandidaten hinzufügt oder entfernt, eine vordefinierte Kandidatenmenge (welche mit den ausgewählten Kandidaten in Beziehung steht) ebenfalls hinzugefügt bzw. entfernt wird. Das Problem Combinatorial Shift Bribery, welches in Kapitel 4 untersucht wird, thematisiert ebenfalls die Manipulation einer Wahl. Hier allerdings kann der externe Agent Änderungen des Abstimmungsverhaltens einiger Wähler herbeiführen. Dabei wird eine

kombinatorische Struktur über den Wählern angenommen, so dass der externe Agent die Position des von ihm präferierten Kandidaten bei mehreren Wählern entsprechend vordefinierter Muster gleichzeitig ändern kann. Das Problem Election Anonymization, welches in Kapitel 5 untersucht wird, befasst sich ebenso mit Wahlen. Das Hauptanliegen hier ist es jedoch, die Privatsphäre der Wähler bei der Veröffentlichung der Stimmenabgaben zusammen mit einigen zusätzlichen (privaten) Informationen aufrecht zu erhalten. Die Aufgabe ist es eine gegebene Wahl so zu verändern, dass jede Stimmenabgabe

mindestens k -fach vorkommt. Dadurch kann noch nicht einmal ein Gegenspieler einzelne Wähler identifizieren, wenn er die Stimmenabgaben einiger Wähler bereits kennt. Die in Kapitel 6 und 7 untersuchten Probleme behandeln gleichermaßen Privatsphärenaspekte. Präziser gesagt, geht es darum, dass ein soziales Netzwerk (modelliert als Graph) veröffentlicht werden soll. Die Aufgabe ist es den Graphen zu anonymisieren; dies bedeutet man verändert den Graphen, so dass es für jeden Knoten mindestens $k - 1$ weitere Knoten mit dem selben Grad gibt. Dadurch wird erreicht, dass selbst ein Gegenspieler, welcher die Knotengrade einiger Knoten kennt, nicht in der Lage ist

einzelne Knoten zu identifizieren. Bei dem Problem Degree Anonymization by Vertex Addition, welches in Kapitel 6 untersucht wird, wird Anonymität durch Einführung neuer Knoten erreicht. Bei dem Problem Degree Anonymization by Graph Contractions, welches in Kapitel 7 untersucht wird, wird Anonymität durch die Kontraktion von möglichst wenigen Kanten erreicht. Das Hauptanliegen dieser Dissertation in Bezug auf die obig genannten Probleme ist es die Grenzen der effizienten Lösbarkeit auszuloten. Insbesondere da die meisten dieser Probleme berechnungsschwer (genauer NP-schwer bzw. sogar schwer zu approximieren) sind,

werden einige eingeschränkte Fälle und Parametrisierungen der Probleme betrachtet. Das Ziel ist es effiziente Algorithmen für sie zu entwickeln, welche in Polynomzeit laufen, wenn einige Parameter konstante Werte aufweisen, oder besser noch zu zeigen, dass die Probleme "fixed-parameter tractable" für die betrachteten Parameter sind. Wenn solche Algorithmen nicht gefunden werden können, dann ist es das Ziel zu beweisen, dass diese Probleme tatsächlich nicht "fixed-parameter tractable" bezüglich der entsprechenden Parameter sind, oder noch besser zu zeigen, dass die Probleme NP-schwer sind, sogar wenn die entsprechenden Parameter konstante

Werte aufweisen.

The Right to Vote

Cambridge University Press

This book examines the changing relationship between social class and voting behavior in contemporary America. At the end of the 20th century, working-class white voters were significantly more Democratic than their middle-class counterparts, as they had been since the 1930s. By the second decade of the 21st century, that long-standing relationship had reversed: Republicans now do better among working-class whites. While Trump accentuated this trend, the change began before 2016, something that has not been fully appreciated or understood. Charles Prysby analyzes this development in American politics in a way that is understandable to a wide audience, not just

scholars in this field.

Drawing on a wealth of survey data, this study describes and explains the underlying causes of the change that has taken place over the past two decades, identifying how social class is directly related to partisan choice. Attitudes on race and immigration, on social and moral issues, and on economic and social welfare policies are all part of the explanation of this 21st century development in American political trends. Rich Voter, Poor Voter, Red Voter, Blue Voter: Social Class and Voting Behavior in Contemporary America is essential reading for scholars, students, and all others with an interest in American elections and voting behavior.

Voting Rights and Election

Law Oxford University

Press

Preface. 1. Facts and Myths

about American Voters: An Introduction. 2. Americans Hate to Love Their Party, but They Do!. 3. Are American Voters Polarized?. 4. Who swings?. 5. Soccer Moms and Other Myths about the Gender Gap. 6. The Young and Not-So-Restless Voters. 7. The Partisan Bias of Turnout. 8. Campaign Effects in the Twenty-First Century. 9. Hard Facts and Conventional Wisdom as We Look to the Future. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Cambridge University Press

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and

offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Electoral Shocks: The Volatile Voter in a Turbulent World offers a novel perspective on British elections, focusing on the role of electoral shocks in the context of increasing electoral volatility. It demonstrates and explains the long-term trend in volatility, how shocks have contributed to the level of electoral volatility, and also which parties have benefited from the ensuing volatility. It follows in the tradition of British Election Study books, providing a comprehensive account of specific election outcomes- the

General Elections of 2015 and 2017-and a more general and novel approach to understanding electoral change. The authors examine five electoral shocks that affected the elections of 2015 and 2017: the rise in immigration after 2004, particularly from Eastern Europe; the Global Financial Crisis prior to 2010; the coalition government of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015; the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014; and the European Union Referendum in 2016. The focus on electoral shocks offers an overarching explanation for the volatility in

British elections, alongside the long-term trends that have led to this point. It offers a way to understand the rise and fall of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Labour's disappointing 2015 performance and its later unexpected gains, the collapse in support for the Liberal Democrats, the dramatic gains of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in 2015, and the continuing period of tumultuous politics that has followed the EU referendum and the General Election of 2017. It provides a new way of understanding electoral choice in Britain, and also beyond, and a better understanding of the

outcomes of recent elections.
Making Votes Count
University of Michigan Press
This is the first book-length comparison of the dynamics of electoral behaviour across a wide range of European countries over the past forty years. Leading scholars come together to assess how voting patterns have changed in six established democracies: Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.
How Dictatorships Work
National Academies Press
Two nationally renowned congressional scholars review the evolution of Congress from the early days of the republic to 2006, arguing that extreme partisanship and a disregard for institutional procedures are responsible for the institution's current state
Electoral Shocks Basic Books
Virginia Election Laws
Securing the Vote
National Academies

Press
Voting Rights Under Fire: The Continuing Struggle for People of Color
ABC-CLIO
An accessible textbook that provides an overview of the historical origins and development of voting theory, this guide explores theories of voting and electoral behaviour at a level suitable for college students.
Electoral Malpractice
Cambridge University Press
This book tells the story of woman suffrage as one involving the diverse politics of women across the country.
General Election Laws of Minnesota
Routledge
Liberal Politicians don't want you to read this book! Bad Politicians are elected by Bible-believing Christians in every election cycle. These politicians count on large numbers of Christians not paying attention to the issues or not even making the effort to go to the polls. Many churches don't promote informed citizenship among

their members. Many Christians vote haphazardly because they don't know what to look for in good politicians, or what voter information resources are available to help them. If you think it's time for your voice to be heard and your vote to count, this is the guide for you. Find Out: How your state ranks on issues in support of, or opposition to your values Why casting your vote in response to a political ad is the worst way to vote What resources are available to help you cast informed votes How a handful of believers can change your elected representative's votes on issues that impact Christians What your options are if your religious rights are attacked What you can do to stem the Anti-Christian laws within your state From The Author ContentsUnit IChapter 1 The Day Jesus Filed for Office Chapter 2 Everything you Need to Know about every Conservative Campaign

Chapter 3 A Vote is a Terrible Thing to Waste-Organizing a Voter Drive at your Church Chapter 4 If Not Now, When? Chapter 5 If Politicians had to take Truth Serum Chapter 6 A Little Theocracy Goes a Long Way Chapter 7 The Siren's Song- Third Parties and Unintended Consequences Chapter 8 Political Etiquette for the Christian Activist Chapter 9Keeping Your Pearls Away from the Swine Chapter 10 Will We Survive? Unit II State Report Cards Unit III Appendix A Campaign Finance Report Sources Appendix B Congressional Votes Appendix C Senate Votes Appendix D How State Grades were Determined Appendix E Sites of Interest to Conservative Christian Voters Appendix F Christian Legal Defense Groups Appendix G Social Media Index Party Voting in Comparative Perspective Virginia Election LawsSecuring the Vote How voters respond to electoral

campaigns

The Increasingly United States
Universit ä tserlag der TU Berlin

Citizenship as Foundation of Rights explains what it means to have citizen rights and how national identification requirements undermine them.

Chapter 6 of the Revised Laws of 1913 Being the General Election Laws of Minnesota
Cambridge University Press
Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.

Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013
Oxford University Press
The study of elections, voting behavior and public opinion are arguably among the most prominent and intensively researched sub-fields within Political Science. It is an evolving sub-field, both in terms of theoretical focus and

in particular, technical developments and has made a considerable impact on popular understanding of the core components of liberal democracies in terms of electoral systems and outcomes, changes in public opinion and the aggregation of interests. This handbook details the key developments and state of the art research across elections, voting behavior and the public opinion by providing both an advanced overview of each core area and engaging in debate about the relative merits of differing approaches in a comprehensive and accessible way. Bringing geographical scope and depth, with comparative chapters that draw on material from across the globe, it will be a key reference point both for advanced level students and researchers developing

knowledge and producing new material in these sub-fields and beyond. The Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior and Public Opinion is an authoritative and key reference text for students, academics and researchers engaged in the study of electoral research, public opinion and voting behavior. Chapter 6 of the Revised Laws of 1913, Being the General Election Laws of Minnesota
Routledge

This thesis explores and exploits structure inherent in voting problems. Some of these structures are found in the preferences of the voters, such as the domain restrictions which have been widely studied in social choice theory [ASS02, ASS10]. Others can be expressed as quantifiable measures (or parameters) of the input, which make them accessible to a parameterized

complexity analysis [Cyg+15, DF13, FG06, Nie06]. Accordingly, the thesis deals with two major topics. The first topic revolves around preference structures, e.g. single-crossing or one-dimensional Euclidean structures. It is covered in Chapters 3 to 5. The second topic includes the parameterized complexity analysis of two computationally hard voting problems, making use of some of the structural properties studied in the first part of the thesis. It also investigates questions on the computational complexity, both classical and parameterized, of several voting problems for two widely used parliamentary voting rules. It is covered in Chapters 6 to 8. In Chapter 3, we study the single-crossing property which describes a natural order of the voters such that for each pair of alternatives, there are at most two consecutive voters along this order which differ in their

relative ordering of the two alternatives. We find finitely many forbidden subprofiles whose absence from a profile is necessary and sufficient for the existence of single-crossingness. Using this result, we can detect single-crossingness without probing every possible order of the voters. We also present an algorithm for the detection of single-crossingness in $O(nm^2)$ time via PQ trees [BL76], where n denotes the number of voters and m the number of alternatives. In Chapter 4, we study the one-dimensional Euclidean property which describes an embedding of the alternatives and voters into the real numbers such that every voter prefers alternatives that are embedded closer to him to those which are embedded farther away. We show that, contrary to our results for the single-crossing property, finitely many forbidden subprofiles are not sufficient to characterize the one-dimensional Euclidean

property. In Chapter 5, we study the computational question of achieving a certain property, as for instance single-crossingness, by deleting the fewest number of either alternatives or voters. We show that while achieving single-crossingness by deleting the fewest number of voters can be done in polynomial time, it is NP-hard to achieve this if we delete alternatives instead. Both problem variants are NP-hard for the remaining popular properties, such as single-crossingness or value-restriction. All these problems are trivially fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter “ number of alternatives to delete ” (resp. “ number of voters to delete ”) because for each studied property there are finitely many forbidden subprofiles whose removal makes a profile possess this property. In Chapter 6, we introduce a combinatorial variant of CONTROL BY ADDING VOTERS. In CONTROL BY ADDING

VOTERS as introduced by Bartholdi III, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], there is a set of unregistered voters (with known preference orders), and the goal is to add the fewest number of unregistered voters to a given profile such that a specific alternative wins. In our new model, we additionally assume that adding a voter means also adding a bundle (that is, a subset) of other voters for free. We focus on two prominent voting rules, the plurality rule and the Condorcet rule. Our problem turns out to be extremely hard; it is NP-hard for even two alternatives. We identify different parameters arising from the combinatorial model and obtain an almost complete picture of the parameterized complexity landscape. For the case where the bundles of voters have a certain structure, our problem remains hard for single-peaked preferences, while it is polynomial-time solvable for

single-crossing preferences. In Chapter 7, we investigate how different natural parameters and price function families influence the computational complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY [EFS09], which asks whether it is possible to make a specific alternative win by shifting it higher in the preference orders of some voters. Each shift has a price, and the goal is not to exceed the budget. We obtain both fixed-parameter tractability and parameterized intractability results. We also study the optimization variant of SHIFT BRIBERY which seeks to minimize the budget spent, and present an approximation algorithm which approximates the budget within a factor of $(1 + \epsilon)$ and has a running time whose super-polynomial part depends only on the approximation parameter ϵ and the parameter “number of voters”. In Chapter 8, we turn our focus to two prominent parliamentary

voting rules, the successive rule and the amendment rule. Both rules proceed according to a linear order of the alternatives, called the agenda. We investigate MANIPULATION (which asks to add the fewest number of voters with arbitrary preference orders to make a specific alternative win), AGENDA CONTROL (which asks to design an appropriate agenda for a specific alternative to win), and POSSIBLE/NECESSARY WINNER (which asks whether a specific alternative wins in a/every completion of the profile and the agenda). We show that while MANIPULATION and AGENDA CONTROL are polynomial-time solvable for both rules, our real-world experimental results indicate that most profiles cannot be manipulated by only few voters, and that a successful agenda control is typically impossible. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-

hard for both rules. While NECESSARY WINNER is coNP-hard for the amendment rule, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive rule. All considered computationally hard voting problems are fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter “ number of alternatives ” . Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Wahlproblemen und den darin auftretenden Strukturen. Einige dieser Strukturen finden sich in den Wahlerpräferenzen, wie zum Beispiel die in der Sozialwahltheorie (engl. social choice theory) intensiv erforschten domain restrictions [ASS02, ASS10], wo die Wahlerpräferenzen eine bestimmte eingeschränkte Struktur haben. Andere Strukturen lassen sich wiederum mittels Problemparametern quantitativ ausdrücken, was sie einer parametrisierten Komplexitätsanalyse zugänglich macht [Cyg+15, DF13, FG06, Nie06]. Dieser

Zweiteilung folgend ist die Arbeit in zwei Themengebiete untergliedert. Das erste Gebiet beinhaltet Betrachtungen zu Strukturen in W -Ählerpräferenzen, wie z. B. Single-Crossing-Strukturen oder eindimensionale euklidische Strukturen. Es wird in den Kapiteln 3 bis 5 abgehandelt. Das zweite Themengebiet umfasst die parametrisierte Komplexitätsanalyse zweier NP-schwerer Wahlprobleme, wobei die neu gewonnenen Erkenntnisse zu den im ersten Teil der Arbeit untersuchten Strukturen verwendet werden. Es beschäftigt sich außerdem mit Fragen sowohl zur klassischen als auch zur parametrisierten Komplexität mehrerer Wahlprobleme für zwei in der Praxis weit verbreitete parlamentarische Wahlverfahren. Dieser Teil der Arbeit erstreckt sich über die Kapitel 6 bis 8. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Single-Crossing-Eigenschaft. Diese beschreibt eine Anordnung der W -Ähler, bei der es für jedes Paar von Alternativen höchstens zwei aufeinanderfolgende W -Ähler gibt, die unterschiedlicher Meinung über die Reihenfolge dieser beiden Alternativen sind. Wie sich herausstellt, lässt sich diese Eigenschaft durch eine endliche Anzahl von verbotenen Strukturen charakterisieren. Ein W -Ählerprofil ist genau dann single-crossing, wenn es keine dieser Strukturen beinhaltet. Es wird außerdem ein Algorithmus vorgestellt, der die Single-Crossing-Eigenschaft unter Verwendung von PQ trees [BL76] in $O(nm^2)$ Schritten erkennt, wobei n die Anzahl der W -Ähler und m die Anzahl der Alternativen ist. Kapitel 4 behandelt W -Ählerprofile, die eindimensional-euklidisch sind, d.h. für die sich die Alternativen und W -Ähler so auf die reelle Achse abbilden lassen, dass für jeden W -Ähler und je zwei Alternativen

diejenigen näher zum Wahlprofil abgebildet wird, die er der anderen vorzieht. Es stellt sich heraus, dass es im Gegensatz zur Single-Crossing-Eigenschaft nicht möglich ist, eindimensionale euklidische Profile durch endlich viele verbotene Strukturen zu charakterisieren. Kapitel 5 beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie berechnungsschwer es ist, eine bestimmte strukturelle Eigenschaft wie z.B. die Single-Crossing-Eigenschaft zu erreichen, indem man eine möglichst kleine Anzahl von Wählern oder Kandidaten aus einem Profil entfernt. Es zeigt sich, dass dieses Problem für die Single-Crossing-Eigenschaft durch das Löschen von Wählern zwar in polynomieller Zeit gelöst werden kann, es durch das Löschen von Kandidaten jedoch NP-schwer ist. Für alle anderen Eigenschaften sind beide Lösungsvarianten ebenfalls NP-schwer. Allerdings lässt

sich für jedes der Probleme auf triviale Weise mittels des Parameters „Anzahl der zu löschenden Wähler bzw. Alternativen“ fixed-parameter tractability zeigen. Das bedeutet, dass sie effizient lösbar sind, wenn der Parameter klein ist. Der Grund dafür ist, dass sich alle hier betrachteten Eigenschaften durch eine endliche Anzahl verbotener Strukturen charakterisieren lassen, deren Zerstörung die gewünschte Eigenschaft herstellt. Kapitel 6 führt die kombinatorische Variante des bekannten Problems CONTROL BY ADDING VOTERS ein, das erstmals durch Bartholdi III, Tovey und Trick [BTT92] beschrieben wurde. In der klassischen Problemstellung gibt es eine Menge von nichtregistrierten Wählern mit bekannten Präferenzen, und es wird eine kleinste Teilmenge von nichtregistrierten Wählern gesucht, sodass deren

Hinzufügen zu einem gegebenen Profil einen bestimmten Kandidaten zum Gewinner macht. In der hier beschriebenen Variante wird zusätzlich angenommen, dass für jeden hinzugefügten Wähler auch eine Menge von weiteren Wählern „kostenlos“ hinzugefügt werden kann. Dieses Problem wird für die beiden bekannten Wahlregeln Condorcet-Wahl und Mehrheitswahl untersucht. Wie sich herausstellt, ist die Problemstellung schon für zwei Alternativen NP-schwer. Desweiteren werden Parameter identifiziert, die sich aus den kombinatorischen Eigenschaften dieses Problems ergeben. Für diese lässt sich eine beinahe erschöpfende Beschreibung der parametrisierten Komplexität des Problems erstellen. In einem Fall, bleibt unser Problem für sogenannte Single-Peaked-Präferenzen berechnungsschwer, während

es für Single-Crossing-Präferenzen in polynomieller Zeit lösbar ist. Kapitel 7 untersucht, wie verschiedene natürliche Parameter und Preisfunktionen die Berechnungskomplexität des SHIFT BRIBERY-Problems [EFS09] beeinflussen. Darin fragt man, ob eine gegebene Alternative zum Gewinner gemacht werden kann, indem sie in den Präferenzen einiger Wähler nach vorne verschoben wird. Jede Verschiebung hat einen Preis, und das Ziel ist es, ein gegebenes Budget nicht zu überschreiten. Die Ergebnisse sind gemischt: einige Parameter erlauben effiziente Algorithmen, während für andere das Problem schwer bleibt, z.B. für den Parameter „Anzahl der beeinflussten Wähler“ ist das Problem sogar $W[2]$ -schwer. Für die Optimierungsvariante von SHIFT BRIBERY, bei der das verwendete Budget minimiert wird, erzielen wir

einen Approximationsalgorithmus mit einem Approximationsfaktor von $(1 + \epsilon)$, dessen Laufzeit in ihrem nicht-polynomiellen Anteil nur von ϵ und der Anzahl der Wähler abhängt. Kapitel 8 konzentriert sich auf zwei weitverbreitete parlamentarische Wahlregeln: die successive rule und die amendment rule. Beide Regeln verwenden eine lineare Ordnung der Alternativen, auch Agenda genannt. Es werden drei Probleme untersucht: MANIPULATION fragt nach der kleinstmöglichen Anzahl von Wählern mit beliebigen Präferenzen, deren Hinzufügung einen bestimmten Kandidaten zum Gewinner macht; AGENDA CONTROL fragt, ob es möglich ist, eine Agenda derart festzulegen, dass ein bestimmter Kandidat gewinnt; POSSIBLE/NECESSARY WINNER fragt für unvollständige

Wählerpräferenzen und/oder eine nur teilweise festgelegte Agenda, ob eine bestimmte Alternative überhaupt bzw. sicher zum Sieger machen kann. Es stellt sich heraus, dass sowohl MANIPULATION als auch AGENDA CONTROL für beide Wahlregeln in polynomieller Zeit lösbar sind. Allerdings deuten die Ergebnisse einer auf realem Wählerverhalten basierenden, experimentellen Studie darauf hin, dass die meisten Profile nicht durch einige wenige Wähler manipuliert werden können, und dass eine erfolgreiche Kontrolle mittels Agenda typischerweise nicht möglich ist. POSSIBLE WINNER ist für beide Regeln NP-schwer, während NECESSARY WINNER für die amendment rule coNP-schwer und für die successive rule in polynomieller Zeit lösbar ist. Alle betrachtete NP-schwere oder coNP-schwere Wahlprobleme sind „fixed-

parameter tractable “ f ü r den
Parameter „ Anzahl der
Alternativen “ .
Voters and Voting in
Context University of
Michigan Press
The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
provides an up-to-date
resource for information on
legal ethics. Federal, state and
local courts in all jurisdictions
look to the Rules for
guidance in solving lawyer
malpractice cases,
disciplinary actions,
disqualification issues,
sanctions questions and
much more. In this volume,
black-letter Rules of
Professional Conduct are
followed by numbered
Comments that explain each
Rule's purpose and provide
suggestions for its practical
application. The Rules will
help you identify proper
conduct in a variety of given

situations, review those
instances where discretionary
action is possible, and define
the nature of the relationship
between you and your clients,
colleagues and the courts.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965
Routledge
The epic history of African
American women's pursuit of
political power -- and how it
transformed America. In the
standard story, the suffrage
crusade began in Seneca Falls in
1848 and ended with the
ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920. But this
overwhelmingly white women's
movement did not win the vote
for most black women. Securing
their rights required a movement
of their own. In Vanguard,
acclaimed historian Martha S.
Jones offers a new history of
African American women's
political lives in America. She
recounts how they defied both
racism and sexism to fight for the
ballot, and how they wielded
political power to secure the
equality and dignity of all persons.
From the earliest days of the

republic to the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and beyond, Jones excavates the lives and work of black women -- Maria Stewart, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, Fannie Lou Hamer, and more -- who were the vanguard of women's rights, calling on America to realize its best ideals.

Virginia Election Laws Forgotten Books

"In an online, interconnected world, democracy is increasingly made up of wikis and blogs, pokes and tweets. Citizens have become accidental journalists thanks to their handheld devices, politicians are increasingly working online, and the traditional sites of democracy--assemblies, public galleries, and plazas--are becoming less and less relevant with every new technology. And yet, Democracy and Public Space argues, such views are leading us to confuse the medium with the message, focusing on electronic transmission when often what cyber citizens transmit is pictures and narratives of real democratic action in physical space.

Democratic citizens are embodied, take up space, battle over access to

physical resources, and perform democracy on physical stages at least as much as they engage with ideas in virtual space. Combining conceptual analysis with interviews and observation in capital cities on every continent, John Parkinson argues that democracy requires physical public space, that some kinds of space are better for performing some democratic roles than others, and that some of the most valuable kinds of space are under attack in developed democracies. He argues that accidental publics like shoppers and lunchtime crowds are increasingly valued over purposive, active publics, over citizens with a point to make or an argument to listen to. This can be seen not just in the way that traditional protest is regulated, but in the ways that ordinary city streets and parks are managed, even in the design of such quintessentially democratic spaces as legislative assemblies. Democracy and Public Space offers an alternative vision for democratic public space, and evaluates 11 cities--from London to Tokyo--against that ideal." --Publisher's website.

Campaign Dynamics American Bar Association
Justices on the Ballot addresses two central questions in the study of judicial elections: how have state supreme court elections changed since World War II? And, what effects have those changes had on election outcomes, state supreme court decisions, and the public's view of the courts? To answer these questions, Herbert M. Kritzer takes the broadest scope of any study to date, investigating every state supreme court election between 1946 and 2013. Through an analysis of voting returns, campaign contributions and expenditures, television advertising, and illustrative case studies, he shows that elections have become less politicized than commonly believed. Rather, the changes that have occurred reflect broader trends in American politics, as well as increased involvement of state supreme courts in hot-button issues.

Listening to the American Voter
Nova Snova
The Taiwan Voter examines the critical role ethnic and national

identities play in politics, utilizing the case of Taiwan. Although elections there often raise international tensions, and have led to military demonstrations by China, no scholarly books have examined how Taiwan's voters make electoral choices in a dangerous environment. Critiquing the conventional interpretation of politics as an ideological battle between liberals and conservatives, *The Taiwan Voter* demonstrates in Taiwan the party system and voters' responses are shaped by one powerful determinant of national identity—the China factor. Taiwan's electoral politics draws international scholarly interest because of the prominent role of ethnic and national identification. While in most countries the many tangled strands of competing identities are daunting for scholarly analysis, in Taiwan the cleavages are powerful and limited in number, so the logic of interrelationships among issues, partisanship, and identity are particularly clear. *The Taiwan Voter* unites experts to investigate the ways in which social identities,

policy views, and partisan preferences intersect and influence each other. These novel findings have wide applicability to other countries, and will be of interest to a broad range of social scientists interested in identity politics.